

- I have observed with growing concern the increasing resort to public disclosure of classified intelligence information.
- It is clear that certain recipients of sensitive intelligence have not been made sufficiently aware of the detrimental effect that public disclosure can have on national--and allied--security.
- In particular, recent press disclosures of U.S. classified intelligence and reference to specific collectors such as [redacted] raise serious questions regarding our understanding of the dangers involved. STAT
- Such disclosures give the USSR and other foreign powers insights into the capabilities and limitations of our intelligence effort.
- Public disclosures tend to undermine the attitude toward security at all levels of government and to lead to further disclosures for clarification and elaboration.
- As a result the effectiveness of our intelligence effort is jeopardized with inevitable negative impacts on the volume and quality of information on foreign intentions and capabilities, which is needed in formulating defense and foreign policy.
- You are urged to take steps to insure that classified intelligence to which you and your organization have access is disclosed only to properly authorized recipients and solely in consonance with applicable orders and regulations.
- Remind intelligence recipients of the sensitivity of intelligence sources and methods and their vulnerability to foreign countermeasures;
- Educate intelligence users on classification¹ and control², the two basic tools for protecting the product and restricting access to those with a need to know the information;
- Insist that public disclosure initiatives are reviewed and approved at the policy level in your organization

¹See Executive Order 12065, Dated 22 December 1978, Subject: National Security Information.

²See Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/7, Dated 18 May 1976, Subject: Control of Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence.

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May 23, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Disclosures of Classified Intelligence

Our national security and the continuing success of the intelligence effort of this Government are being adversely affected by the appearance in public information media of classified intelligence, including information tending to reveal intelligence sources and methods. Sources of a continuing nature and methods of intelligence collection have been jeopardized and in some instances great harm has been done to the intelligence effort. I am concerned over the serious damage thus caused to national security. It is clear that certain recipients of classified information, including intelligence, have not been made sufficiently aware of the detrimental effect which their disclosures may have or that such recipients have been careless in the handling of such information.

I direct that immediate action be taken in your respective departments and agencies to prevent the disclosure of classified intelligence except to properly authorized recipients. Further, I direct that action be taken to ensure that the disclosure of classified intelligence be made solely in consonance with applicable statutes, regulations and this directive. Recipients of classified intelligence shall be made especially aware of the damage that can accrue to intelligence sources and methods through the improper disclosure of intelligence. Existing procedures for the control of classified intelligence, and for limiting access thereto, shall be reviewed and corrective action shall be taken where undue reliance upon routine administrative methods or other inadequacies are found.

In particular each department or agency shall conduct a continuing review of its dissemination of classified intelligence with a view to

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
ensuring that such dissemination is confined to authorized recipients both within the Government and to consultants and contractors on a strict need-to-know basis. No further dissemination of such information will be made outside of these authorized channels without an assessment by the appropriate Intelligence Chief of the risks to our national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

In keeping with the responsibility vested in the Director of Central Intelligence for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I shall look to that official to assure the issuance of appropriate guidance to departments and agencies, as required in the implementation of this directive. I shall expect department and agency heads receiving this guidance to see that it is carried out within their departments and agencies. The Director of Central Intelligence shall keep me informed of developments under this directive and make appropriate recommendations, including additional legislation as may be proposed by the United States Intelligence Board.

/s/

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT : Public Disclosure of Classified
Intelligence Information

1. In keeping with my statutory responsibilities for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I have observed with growing concern the increasing resort to public disclosure of classified intelligence information. Despite the President's injunction of 21 December 1970 urging caution in the public release of classified information, the frequency of such disclosures has reached alarming levels.

2. I have attached as an annex to this memorandum a partial chronology of significant disclosures of classified intelligence information in 1971. This annex illustrates clearly that although any single disclosure may not seem critical, the cumulative impact of this practice is quite sobering.

3. I fully appreciate the occasional temptation to use intelligence information to foster public support of policies in such matters as weapons programs and arms control. But I would be remiss in my obligations if I did not point out that whatever the short-term gains, this

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practice may well jeopardize our ability to provide the intelligence support required for formulating defense policy and monitoring arms control over the longer term.

4. This flood of public disclosures of classified information gives the USSR and other foreign powers keen insights into the capabilities and limitations of our intelligence system. It also tends to undermine the attitude toward security at all levels of Government which in turn encourages more disclosures for clarification and elaboration. The inevitable result of these disclosures could be a sharp curtailment of the effectiveness, if not the disappearance, of some of our most important intelligence sources.

5. The objective of this memorandum is to alert you to this potential danger and to enlist your cooperation in eliminating any further public disclosures which can only damage our intelligence posture.

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Richard Helms
Director

Attachment

ADDI [] (4 June 71) .

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